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In general equilibrium models labour supplied by consumers is represen-
te3 by some components of the consumption vector. It is assumed that
ccnsumers are free to choose the quantities of labour of different ty-
pes, that they will supply. However in reality many types of labour may
only be supplied in fixed quantities, because the length of the labour
day is fixed. Reason for this fixation m~y be that the production pro-
cess requires all workers to be present simultanuously, or that working
hour~ are fixed by govemment of through collective action by trade
unions.
in the present paper we assume that a unique labour time t has to be
t'ixed. We consider two problems: the existence of equilibrium Por fixed
t and the optimum quantity of t, given that a unique t should be fixed.
As was noted by Preze (1976) it appears that t may be considered as so-
me kind ot' public good. It is shown that a Lindahl-type equilibrium can
be defined and the private goods equilibrium for fixed t is a local pa-
reto optimum, provided that the mean difference between personalized
wages and equilibrium wages is zero. That only a local optimum follows,
is caused by the non convexity of the global set of feasible solutions.
Our problem is formally similar to the problem of investment under un-
certainty, as considered in Dreze (1974).
We consider an economy with a finite set of tyges of conaumers, while
there is an infinity of consumers of each type. The reason for this ap-
proacli is that we wish to rule out consequences of the fixation of t in
production.
Wa take a finite number of types of consumers rather than a contiuum of
consumers, because this keeps the analysis relatively simple.
1) The author thanks B. v.d. Genugten for some valuable suggestions.- 2 -
2. TY.e model.
We consider the econouty
E - {{Xi},{~i},S,{ui},{wi},y,{gi}}
2. i. Commodir.ies an~i labour.
There are m commodities and n different types of labour. The commodity
space is Rm}n and a typical element of this set is
1 2 m 1 2 n
(x,z) - (x ,x ,...,x ,z ,z ,...,z ). There is a labour time regulac:ic.r:,
which prescribes that each censumer can only suppiy a fixed quantity of
at most one type of labour. The labour time is t~ 0. (Among the m com-
modities could figure types of labour for which the time regulat~or, 3oe:
not hold.)
L-{0,1,2,...,n} is the set of labour typea; k- 0 means "not worl:ine;".
In the price vector (p,q) E Rm}n, p is the price vector of commodites
t
and q the price vect.or of types of labo~,ir.
2.2. Consumers.
There is a sPt S containing infinitel,y many consumers. There are h uif-
ferent types of consu.mers, where h is e finite number. I-{1,2,...,h}
denotes the set of indices of consumer types. Consu.~ners of the same type
have identical consumption sets, identical preferences, ider,tical resour-
ces and identícal profit-rights. Si C S is the set of consumers vf type
i E I; U S. - S; if i~ j, S n S. '~.
i i ,7
u is a measure on the measurable space (S,~),Á~ being ttie ~orel sets ur
S, with S. E~ and such that u(S) - 1, u(S.) - V. ~ 0, (hence Eu. - 1).
1 i i i
Ui is the proportion of consumers that are of type i.
Definition 2.2.1.: A distribution of Si is a pair (ai,Ki), where K. is
a finite set of indices {1,2,...,ai},
ai -(ai1'ai2'" ''aia.)~
such that
Eaik s 1 and aik ~ U and such that a partitioning of :.i intó disjointsubsets ~ik exists,'for which
u(Sik) - aikui' t
K. - {k E K.la.. ~ 0}.
i i ix
Xi c Rm}n is the constunption set of type i consumers. On Xi is defined
tae preference relation ~i~(x,z) 1i (x',z') means (s,z) ~i ( x',z') and
(x',z') ~i (x,z). Ci:Xi -~ Xi and Pi:Xi a Xi are called preference cor-
respondence and strict preference correspondence respectively, where
Ci(x,z) - {(x',z')I(x',z') ~i (x,z)} and
Pi(x,z) - {(x'~z~)~(x',z') ii (x.Z)}.
Each member of Si has a bundle of resources (wi,0) E R~n; so resources
do not contain labour. 'Phe mean resources of the economy are given by
the vector (w,0) - Eui(wi,0). Each conaumer of type i has profit rights
f3i(p,q), 6i(p,q) being a continuoua function, such that EuiBi(p,q) - 1.
The mean profit of the econo~y is n(p,q). Mean income in the econoaly is
pw } n(p,q) and individual income is cpi(p,q) - pwi t 6i(p,q)n(p,q).
2.3. Production.
We or,ly consider a single production aet Y C fim}n, which mc~,y be consi-
dered as a siim of production sets of individual firms.
Points (y,v) E Y represent mean production of commodities and mean la-
bour input, w.r.t. the consumers in the econoa~y. The (mean) profit as-
sociated with a production vector (y,v), is py t qv - n(p,q), and we
shall assume that labour may only be an input in production, hence
v ~ 0. :
Note that the implicitely assume that the commodity vector y is related
to the (mean} input of labour and does not depend on the wey in which v
is supplied i.e. if many workers supply a small quantity of labour of
a certain type or if fewer workers supply a larger quantity. Thís may
be unrealistic but it is certainly not more unrealistic than the tradi-
tional assumption that each consumer m~y freely choose the quantity of
labour to supply.2.4. Feasible solutions.
In the economy E a feasible solution consists of an
(mtn)(ht1) t 1- tuple(((xi,zi)),(y,v),t), such that
(i) there exist diatributions (ai,Ki) and consumption vectors
t
(x. ,z. ) E X. for all i and k E K., such that (x.,z.) - Ea. (x. ,z. ) ik ik i R ~, i i i ik tk ik
and zik - 0 or zik --~ and zik - ~, for some D and R.' ~!C.
(ii) Eui(xi.zi) ~ (Y.v)-
(iii) (y,v) E y,
Determinatíon of the commodity vector xik and of the type of labour to
supply, could be left to individual consumers. The determination of t
however must be a result of some collective decision process.
In section 4 we consider equilábria if t is given. In section 5 we shall
consider optimum values for t.3. Assumptions.
We make the following assumptiona:
on the consumption set; for all i:
A1 X. is clcsed
i
:a2 X. is bounded below
i
A3 if ( x,z) E Xi, then z ~ 0 and if x' ~ x, 0~ z' ~ z then
(x',z') E Xi.
Au X. is convex
i
on preferences; for all i:
B1 (x',z') E Ci(x,z) ~ Ci(x',z') C Ci(x,z) (transitivity)
B2 for all ( x,z),(x',z') E Xi:(x,z) E Ci(x',z') or
(x',z') E Ci(x,z) (completeness)
B3 for all (x,z) E Xi: Ci(x,z) is closed and Pi(x,z) is open
(continuity)
B4 if (x,z),(x',z') E Xi and ( a) (x',z') ~(x,z) then
(x',z') E Ci(x,z) (weak monotonicity) and (b) x' ~ x and z' ~ z
then ( x',z') E Pi(x,z). -
B5 if (x,z) ~i ( x',z'), there exists x ~ x, such that (x,z) E Xi
B6 Por all (x,z) E Xi, Ci(x,z) is convex.
on the set of consumers:
C for all i: if Ki is a finite set of indices,
aik ~ 0' ~aik -~'
there exists a partitioning of Si into disjount subsets
Sik'
such that u(Sik) - uiaik' ( atomlessness).
on the production set:
í? 1 Y is closed
ll~ Y is convex
D3 Y is bounded above
Da (x,v) E Y~ v ~ 0
D5 OEy- 6
on initial resources:
E tli - (wi,0) E Xi (feasibility)
So in particular we assume that consumption of positive quantities of
labour is impossible, for R- 1,2,...,n.
Assumption B5 is necessary to ensure that continuity is preserved for
mean preferences, to be defined in the next section (see remark in 4.2
below). It implies that points of the lower boundary of Xi and of each
preference set Ci(xi,zi) are equivalent. Ancther conseq~lence of B5 will be that
any quasi-equilibrium is an equilibrium, so we need not bother about
quasí-equilibria. Assumption C means that each pair (ai,Ki) is a dis-
tribution in the sense of definitíon 2.2.1. ït implies that the measure
u is atomless (see e.g. Hildenbrand 1974). The other assumptions are
standard in equilibrium theory. Note however that the feasibility assump-
tion E is extremely strong: it permits all consumers to survive without
working. Convexity (Ak and B6) will only be required in section 5).
Proposition 3.1.: Under the assumptions A1, A2, A3, B3, B1t and B5:
(1) if (x,z) EXi and for x' ~ x,(x',z) ~ Xi, then Xi - Ci(x,z);
(2) Pi(x,z) -{(x,z)I(x,z) E Ci(x,z} and ~x ~ x:(x,z) E Ci(x,z)}.
Proof: (1) Let (x,z} E X. and (x',z) ~ X, for x' ~ x; suppose
1 1
there would exist (x,z) E Xi, such that (x,z) ~i (x,z). Then
by B5, z ~ x would exist such that (z,z) E X.. That is a con-
i
tradiction. Hence for all (x,i) E Xi:(z,z) yl (x,z).
(2) Let (x',z') ~i (x,z). By BS,there exists x ~ x, such tt,nt.
(x,z) E Xi, and by monotonicity: (x',z') ~i (x,z'). By conti-
nuity there exists x~ z ~ x', such that (x,z) ~i (x,z).~~. I.abour time given.
Let r ~ 0 be fixed beforehand. For an individual consumer the labour-
time restriction is essentially a restriction on his budget set. However
we shall formulate the problem in such a way that the time restriction
is included in the consumption set and in the preferences. Thia is done
t.y 3efír.ing mean consumption and mean preferences for each consumer type,
and thus deriving an econo~ Et from E.
We do not assume in this section the convexity of the consumption set
and of preferences.
b.1. Mean consumption set.
Let U be the set of n negative unit vectors and a vector of zero's:
0 1 2 n
U - {u ,u ,u ,...,u }
where uU - (O,O,...~C)s u~ ~ (-1,0,....U)~ u2 - (0~-1,...,0) ,..., un -
(u,0,...,-1). We define:
XitR - Xi ~~ {( x, z) E}Ci I z- tuR }
Por ?. E L. So XitR contains all possible consumption bundles where an
individual consumer supplies t units of labour of type R E L. Define
Xit - L Xitk












J{itR ~y be empty for some R~ 1, if consumers of type i are
not able to supply t units of labour of type R. In this case for any
(xi'zi) E Xi(t)'zi - C' XitO ~~' by assumption E(see fig. 2).
If
(xi'zi) E Xit'
then, by definition,(xi,zi) is s convex combination
of at most mtntl points in 3Cit. Hence by assumption C, there exist a
distribution (Bik,Ki), for Ki - {1,2,...,mtnti}, and vectors
f
(xik'zik) E Rit, for k E Ki, such that:




(xi,zi) is a mean consumption vector of consumers in Si and
(xik'zik)
is the consumption of consumers in the associated subs}ts Sik, WRhile
u(Sik),ui - Sik'
For all k: zik E tU. Let KiR -{k E Ki~zik - tu }, for
R E L. Then
~ Sik ~ t (-zi)
if R ~ 1
KiRKE Slk - 1} t Rz1 i0
Lefine




(xi,zi) - r E(xik,tuR) - EaiR E alk (xik,tuR) - EaiR(xiR,tuQ)
A Ki~ R KiR i?, k
R, ~ik 2
where (xiR,tu ) - E a (xik,tu ).
KiQ ik
Her,ce (aiR,L), is a distribution of Si and (xiR,tu~) are the mean consump-
tior.s of consumers in the associated subsets Si~, consisting of the con-
sumers of Si who supply labour of type ~.. (xi,zi) is the mean consump-
tion oi' these mean consumptions. For all Q E Li, there exists a distri-
bution (Yik,KiR), where
Yik -~ik, C Sik ~d this distribution produces
R KiR R
the mean consumptions (xiR,tu ) from (xik,tu ).
Remark: Note that if Xi is convex (assumption A4), all (xiQ,tuR) are in
Xit'
jJote also that (xi,zi) could be expressed by different convex com-
binations, so that the distribution (BiR,Ki) is not unique. However
(aiR,L) is unique, since it is uniquely determined by zi.
'P}ieorem 4.1.: Under the assuiuptions A1, A2, A3, for Xi, and C, the con-
sumption sets Xit fullfill assumptions A1, A2, A3 and A4.
Droof: see appendix.
4.2. Mean preferences.
For c~ 0, we construct a new preference correspondence Cit, represen-
ting a r.ew preference relation Zit on
Xit~




- Ci(x,z) n XitR
Cit(x,z) - U CitR(x,z)
R
Cit(x,z) - Co Cit(x,z)
Define
Cit:Xit i Xit by:
A(x,z) - i(x,o) E Xito~(x~z) E cit(x~o)}
cit(x,z) - n cit(x,o)
A(x,z)
Cit is the preference correapondence, representing the preference rele~
tion ~it, which is defined:
(x',z') ~it (x,z) p (x',z') E Cit(x'z)
We define Pit(x,z) - {(x',z')~(x',z') E Cit(x,z) and (x,z) ~ Cit(x''z')1'
Theorem ~.2.: Under assumptions A1 - A3, B1 - B5 and C, the preference
relation ?it fUllfills B1 - B6.
Proof: see appendix.
With any point (x,z) E Xi are associated a distribution (Ri,Ki) and vec-
i
tors (xk,zk) E Cit(x,z), for k E Ki, such that (x,z) - Es~xk,zk); for
t
k,k' E Ki,(xk,zk) ~i (xk „ zk,): since by lemma A(appendix), (x,z) is on
the boundary of Cit(x,z), it is a convex combination of boundary points
of Cit(x,0), for some (x,0) E Xit and by preposition 3.1 these boundary
points are equivalent ~.r.t. Zi. By definition they are also equivalent
w.r.t. ~it, i.e.
(~c'zk) ~it (xït" zk') Nit
(x,z).
As was shown in section 4.1, (x,z) can also be expressed as a convex com-
bination of oints t p (xiR,tu ). These pcints are also equivalent to (x,z)- 11 -
w.r.t. ~it. Note that if }i would be convex, than (xiR,tu~) E Cit(x,0).
ilerlark: Without assumption B5 ?it
needs not be continuous and the points
(xk,zk), considered above, need not be equivalent w.r.t. ~i. Consider




Xi is the set above the thick line; Xit is the shaded area. The indif-
feren~-e curves of yi are lines parelled to I(a).
We have: a~i b; a E Cit(b) - Cit(b) - Cit(c); b~ Cit(a) -
~,it(a)'
c~ Cit(a). Hence a yit c~it
b. c is a convex combination of the





for t. ~ 0 and Xit and 7it as defined in the previous se~tions, we define:Definition 4.3.: An equilibrium in Et is s set of inean consumptions
(xi'zi) E Xit'
a Production vector (y,v) E Y and price vectors (p,q),
such that
(1) Eui(xi,zi) - (Y,v) t (w,0)
(2) For all i, ( xi,zi) is best w.r.t.
~it
in the budget set {xi,zi~pxi t qzi ~~i(p,q)}
(3) PY t qv - max{PY t qv~(Y,v) E Y} - max (P,q)Y.
With such an equilibrium are associated distributions ( ai,L), mean con-
t
sumptíons ( xiR,tu ) for k E Li, and subsets SiR C Si, with
u(SiR) - uiaiR;
the membe'rs of SiR supply t units of labour oP type R
and have mean consumption xiR. Members of SiR may have different con-
sumptions of commodities
xiRk ( see section 4.1), however all points
R
(xiRk'tu
) are elements of the boundary of the budget set.
Theorem 4.4.: Under assumption A1 - A3, B1 - B5, C, D and E, an equi-
librium in Et exists.
Proof: By theorems 1~.1 and 4.2, the consumption sets Xit and
the preferences ~it, fu11fi11 A1 - A4 and B1 - B4. Under these
assumptions, existence can be proved by standard methods, ap-
plied in an econontyy with a finite number of consumers. In the
proof summation over consumption bundlea should on]~ be repla-
ced by weighted summation, with weights yi.- 13 -
j. Labour time as a public Rood.
In the preceding section t was assumed given. In this section we consi-
der the problem of the optimal value of t. Since t is binding for con-
sumers with different preferences, it appears that labour time is some
kind of public good, hence it seems natural to consider Lindahl equili-
bria.
Let the economy E be as defined ín section 2. Instead of the income dis-
tribution ~.(p,q) of section 2.2, we apply an after transfer income
i
distribution. Given (aiR,L) the income of iR-consumers is
piQ(P~q) - ~Di(P~9.) t Tik
T E Rh(ntt) ~,e the transfers paid to iR-consumers, where E a. u.t. - 0,
hence E aiRUiPik(p'q) - ~vi~i(p'q)
iR, i
Tr. this section we assume convexity of Xi and of Zi (A4 and B6).
5.1. A sin~le type of labour.
We first consider a speciaï case:
(a) there is only one type of labour
(b) all consumers are obl.iged to work.
Giver. (a) and (b) a feasible solution in E consists of t~ 0,
(x.,zi1 E X1, (y,v) E y, such that (i) for all i: zi --t and
!ii) Fuil"xi,zi) ~ (Y~v).
No distributions of Si are necessary in this case to define a feasible
soluticn because, by convexity, a mean consumption (xi,zi) is in the
consumption set (Compare section 2.4).
We exactly have the model of an economy with private goods and one pu-
blic good, (or rather with one public '~ad"). For such a model a Lindahl
equilibrium witti personalized prices for the public good can be defined.Definitiun 5.1.: A Lindahl equilibrium is the econo~y E given conciitions
(a) a.iid (b), and with income distribution pi, is an allocation (xi), a
price vector p, labour time t, personalized prices (wages) qi, a produ-
cer's wage q and a production bundle (y,v), such that
(i) for each i, (xi,-t) is best w.r.t. Zi in the budget set
{(x,z) E Xi~Px t qiz ` pi(P,q)}
(ii) Eui(xi,-t) ~ (Y,v) } (w,0)
(iii)
Euiqi - q
(iv) PY t qv - max (P,4)Y
In the Lindahl-equilibrium, consumers of different types may get a dif-
ferent wage qi for the same type of labour. In the equilibrium in Et a11
consumers get the same wage. If (a) and (b) hold, Lhe consumpticn set
in Et is Xit - C~it1' ~d a solution (xi,-t), (y,t), (p,q) is an equili-
brium if (1) Eyi(xi,-t) -(y,t) t(w,0); (2) (xi,-t) is best in the bud-
get set and (3) (y,-t) is profit maximizing. If pi(p,q) -~Pi(p,q), a
Lindahl equilibrium in E, with solution t- t, will generally not cor-
respond to an equilibrium in Et, since this would require for all i:
Pxi-qit -`~i(p'q) - pxi }
qt' which wouïd impl.y qi - q, for all i.
However the equilibrium (xi,zi),(p,q),(y,v) in Et could correspond to a
Lindahl-equilibrium in E with income transfers: Taking into account the
convexity assumptíons Ab and B6, the hyperplanes {(xi,-t)~pxi-qt -~i(p,q)}
support the preference sets Cit(xi,-t) - Ci(xi'-t) n Xit1
in (xi,-t).
There exist qi and pi, such that the hyperplanes {xi,-t~pxi-qit - pi}
support the (original) preference sets Ci(xi,-t) in (xi,-t); so these
points are best w.r.t. the original preference relation ~i in that bud-
get set.
We now have simultanuously pxi - qt - ~yi(p,q) and pxi - qit - p~ hence
pi - ~i(P,4) t (qi-q)t.- 15 -
Therefore {(xi),p,(qi),q,(y,v)} is a Lindahl equilibrium in E for the
income distribution pi, provided that
Euiqi - q, for then (iii) of defi-
nition k.1.1 is fullfilled. Then the income distribution p. could be i
realized from the income distribution ~i(p,q) by transfers (qi-q)t, since
Zuitqi-q)t -O. Obviously this solution is efficient since a Lindahl
~quilibrium is efficient. On the other hand, if (xi,-t),p,q,(qi),(y,v)
is a Lindahl equilibrium in E for the original income distribution ~.,
i
tkien (xi,-t),(p,q),(y,v) is an equilibrium in Et for the after transfer
income distribution
Pi - ai(p'q) - (qi-q)t'
5.2. llifferent types of labour.
Things become more complex, if there are different types of labour, in-
cluding the case of one type of labour, where consumers are allowed not
tc work. The reason is, like in Dréze (1974), that the set of feasible
solutions in E is not convex. This can be shown by the following counter-
example:
Iti~t n - i; ((xi,zi),t,(y,z)) and ((xi,ái),.t,(y,z)} are two feasible so-
lutions. Assume that consumers of type 1 are not able to supply much mo-
re labour than t, i.e. for some e~ 0: if t~ ttE, then
}C1i1 -~. Let
t~ tte, hence zi - 0. Let zl ~ 0, hence there exist x10 and x11, such
that for a10 - 1 t~ z1 and a11 -- t z1. (x1'z1) - a10(x10,0) t a11(x11,-t).
Consider the convex combination produced by 0 ~ y ~ 1, such that
t- yt t(1-y)t ~ t}e. Hence X1t1 -~. However ( xl,z1) - y(x1'z1) t
(1-y)(x1,z1) and z1 ~ 0. So we must have, for a10 - 1 t t zl and
a11 -- t zl ~ 0~ (x1'z1) - a10(x10'0) } a11(x11,-t), which is impossi-
ble, since (x11,-t) ~ X1t1 - ~.
However, if the distribution of consumers over types of labour is fíxed,
tha srt ef feasible solutions is convex. Particularly let (ai,L) be given
and (x.,z.) and ( x.,z.) are feasible consumptions of type i consumers,
i i i i
where labcur time is t and t respecQively, then a~R -- t zi --~ z~
(for Q ~ 1) and there exist ( xiR,tu ) and (xiR,~u ) in Xi, for R~ Ll~such that (xi,zi) - Lt aiR(xiR,tuR)
snd
(xi'zi) E Lt aiR(xiR,tuR).
Then
i i
for 1 ~ y~ 0, we have (xi,zi)
- Y(xi,zi) }(1-Y)(xi,zi) -
EaiR(Y(xiR'ziR)}(1-Y)(xiR,ziR) E Xi by assumption A4.
For (ai,L) given, we reduce E to an econo~yy Ea with a single labour
variable t. This is possible since the distribution determines the type
of labour to supply by each consumer and because the composition of the
R
total supply of labour is fixed: v- t(EaiRUiu ).
For a set of distributions (ai,L), we define the econo~
Ea - {{XiR}'{~iR}'SiR'{uiaiR},{wi},Y,{ei},T11}
for iR E I-{i,Rli E I and R E Li}.
For R ~ 1:
XiR -{(x,-t)~(x,tuR) E xi} c Rmti
(x,-t) iiR (x~,-t~) " (x ftuR) ~i (x~,t~uR)
For R - 0:
Xi0 -{(x,-t)I(x,0) E Xi and t? t~ 0}
~X,-t) 1i0 (X~,-t~) " ( X,0) ~i (x~,0)
where t is such that, for all i E I: Xit -~(see section 4.1). Such a
t exists, since all Xi are bounded below by A2.
Y - {(Y,-t)~(Y,EUiaiRtuR) E Y}
and
PiR -~i(P,q) t TiR - Pwi t ei(P,q)n(P,q) t TiR.
Definition 5.2.: A Lindahl equilibrium in Ea is an allocation
(xiR),a labour time t, a price vector p E Rm, a producer's composite wage
q C R},personalized wages qiR E Rt, such that:
(1) for all (i,R) ~ I: (xi~,-t) is best w.r.t. ~iR in the budget set
{(x,-t)~Px - qiRt ~ piA.(P~q)
(~) EaiRUixiR - Y
(3) ~aiRUiqiR - 4
(4) py - qt - max (P.4)Y
Íhe personalízed wages qiR are the shadow prices of labour of type R,
supplied by consumers of type ik. The wage q is a composite wage; the
profit maximizing wage of the producer for a bundle EuiaíQtu~.
Proposition 5.3.: (xiR),y,t,p,q,qiR is a Lindahl equilibrium in Ea, if
and only if there exist q E Rn and qiR E Rn, such that
(~~) for all ( iR) E I: (xi~,tuR) is best in the budget set
{ x,zlpx t qikL ~ piR}
w.r.t. ~i
(n) iRai2ui(xi~,tuQ) - (y.v)
(`) i~aikui(4iRuR-quQ) - 0
(3) PY } qv - max (P~4)Y
k k
" ) }i;, - qiR and q - 4(EaiQUiRu )
:roof: Define H(p,q,p) -{x,z~px f qz - p} C Rmtn and
H(p~q~p) -{x,-t~px - 4t - p} C Rm}n.
(a) For ~. ? 1, H(p,qilL'piR) supports the set
~iR.(xiR'-t) - {(xiR,-t)~(x'.-t') ~i~ (xiR,-t)}in (xiQ,-t).Hence the set S-{(x,z)Ipx t qiX,zR - piR} supports
CiR(xiR,tuR) in (xiR,tuR). These two sets are convex and there-
fore can be separated by a hyperplane H(p,q,piR) and this hy-






) in (xiR,tu ),
then H(p,qiR,piR) supports CiR(xiR'-t) in (xiR,-t).
For R- 0, qiC - 0, by the definition of ~i0'
(d) Let H(p,q,n) support 4 in (y,-t). The set
S'{Y~~v~IPY~ - qt - n and v' - EaiRUituR} supports Y in (y,v).
Hence S and Y are separated by a hyperplane H(p,q,n) which con-
tains S, so p- p and qt - qv' S q(EaiRUiuR)t and n- max (p,q)Y.
Conversely, if py t qv - max (p,q)Y, v- EaiRUituR and
q- EaiRUiuR, then for all (y',t') E Y,
R
PY~ } q(aiRUiu )t~ - PY~ - qt~ ~ PY - qt - pY t qv, hence
PY - qt - max (p,q)Y.
Theorem 5.~.: Under the assumptions A1 - A4, B1 - B6, C, D and E there
exists a Lindahl equilibrium in Ea.
Proof: It is easy to prove, that
XiR' ~iR ~d Y fullfill all
assumptions A1 - A4, B1 - Bfí and D1 - D5.
These assumptions are sufficient to prove the existence of a
Lindahl equilibrium. In the prooS summation over individizals
should be replaced by weighted summation, using weights
aiR~i'
(See e.g. Milleron (1972), R~yys (197~).)
Let (xi,zi),(p,q),(y,v),t be an equilibrium in Et for




~is equilibrium corresponds to a Lindahl
equilibrium, if and only if their exist prices qiR and incomes piR, auch
that (xiR,tuR) is best in {x,zlpx f qiRz ~ piR}
and
Ea. u-(q. - q)tuR - 0. Since p. - pw. t A.(P.q)~(P.q) } t. -
iR i iR R - iR i i
-- - R iR
PxiR } qiq,tu and ~iR - Pwi t ei(P.4)s(P~q) - PxiR } qtu , this implies
TiR -(qiR-q)tuR.and ETiR - Eaikyi(qiR-q)tuR
- 0. So the transfers are
only conceptual and need not effectively be paid.6. Equilibria and Pareto optima.
.~ince the feasible solutions in E are not a convex set, it is not clear
if equilibria and optimal solutions in E exist and what are their pro-
perties (compare Dreze (197k), sectíon III).
A natural definition for a"second best" optimum seems to be: a solution
that is: (1) a Pareto optimum for fixed labour time and (2) a Pareto op-
timum for given distributions over types of labour. Similarly an equili-
t:rium in E could be defined as a solution that is: (1) an equilibrium
ir~ Et and (2) a Lindahl equilibrium in Ea for the after transfer income
R R
li:-tribution
PiR -(qiR - q)t' (~ ~ternative definition: a Lindahl
equilibrium for the origina:l income distribution and a equilibrium for
some after transfer income distribution, seems to be leas reasonable,









that effectivel,y different wages are paid for
finding such an equilibrium, would run as fol-
arbitrasy t and find an equílibrium in Et;
shadow prices qiR at the equilibrium consumptions and
compute Y- EoiRUi(qiR - qR)' If y- 0, the
first step is also a Lindahl equilibrium in
crease t, it y ~ 0, decrease t;
equilibrium of the
Ea. If y~ 0, in-
(~) For the new labour time t', find a new equilibrium in Et,;
And so on, until y- 0.
It is however not known if this procedure would converge, since cycling
ís not excluded.
A(purely conceptusl) procedure for finding a second best Pareto optimum,
could consist of a sequence of steps 1,2,3,..., where in the odd steps
an equilibríum (or a Pareto optimum) is determined in Et and in the even
steps a Lindahl equilibrium (or a Pareto optimum) in Ea. In each step
~he reseurces of consumers consist of the consumption bundle of the pre-
ceeding step. These resources are to be understood as claims on commo-
dities and obligations to work. The procedure is described in Appendix
B. To prcve convergence one needs additional assumptions, as e.g. in
Lreze (197~) or in Chamsaur, Dreze, Henry (~977).-zo-
7. Final remark.
It was assumed that there is to be a single labour time for all types of
labour. ~e preceeding model could be generalized to allow for different
labour times for different types of labour, and to allow for s small
number of different labour times for the same type of labour.Appendix.
We denote by A and B the assumptions of section 3 w.r.t, Xi and ~i, and
by Á s.nd B the same assumptions w.r.t.
Xit ~d ~it'
Proof of theorem 4.1.:
By A1 and A2, Xi is cloaed and unbounded, hence also Xit is ciosed and
~.nbounded and also its convex hull Xit, which is convex by definition.
Tiiis proves A1, Á2 and A4.
If (x,tu~) E Xit and x' ? x, then (x',tuR) E Xit: there exist (Sk,K)
and (xk,tuR) E Xit, for k E K}, such that (x,tuR) - ERk(xk,tuR). By A2:
(xk }(x'-x),tuR) E Xít, hence (x',tuR) - Esk(xk f(x'-x),tuQ) E Xit'
by the argument used in section 4.1, for (x,z) E Xit, there exist (aR,L)
and (x ,tuR) for R E L, such that
aQ --Rt zR (if R. ~ 1) and a0 - 1
write:
(x,z) - EaR(xR,tuR), and where
t t EzR. Let ( x,z) ~ (x,z); we may
a0(x0 }(x-x),0) } E- t zR(xR t(x-x),tuR) }
R~1
E - t (zR - zR)(xR } ( x-x),0) -
2~1
(EaRx,- t EzRtuR) - (x,z)
6ince by A2: (x t(x-x),tuR) and (x t(x-x),0) are in X. , whereas
R, R i t
a0 t E(- t zR ~ t E(- t( zR - zR )- EaR - 1 and - t zR ~ 0 and
R~1 - k`1
- I ~ ze - zR )~ 0( since t~-zR ~
t -
-ZR),(X,Z) is a convex combination
of ~ints in Xit, so (x,z) E Xit. This proves Á3.
Lemma A: For all (x,z) E Xit, there exists ( x,U) E Xi, such that
Cit(x,z) - Cit(x,0) and x' ~ x implies ( x',z) ~ Cit(x,z).Proof:
(a) A(x,z) ~~: Choose (x,0) E Xi such that, if x' ~ x, (x,0) E Xi. By
proposition 3.1 Ci(x,0) - Xi, hence Cit(x,0) - Xit, so (x,0) E p(x,z)
for aay (x,z) E Xit~
(b) A(x,z) ~ XitO:
Let (P,q) E RLtM~ (P~q) ~ 0, px t qz ~ 1, and
B~{(x,z) E Xi~px t qz ~ 1}. B is compact and contains a maximal ele-
ment (z,z) w.r.t. 1i (by continuity and transivity). Hence
(x,z) ~ Co Ci(z,"z) ~ Cit(x,z), and by monotonicity: Cit(z,z) ] Cit(x,C).
Hence (z,0) ~ A(x,z).
(c) A(x,z) is closed: by continuity and monotonicity Ci has a closed
graphe. The graphe of Cit, being the intersection of the graphe of Ci
and the closed set Xit x Xit, is also closed. Cit, being the convex hull
of a closed correspondence, is also closed. This implies that A(x,z) is
a closed set, since A(x,z) - Cit (x,z) n XitO~
(d) Let (x',0) E A(x,z) and (x",0) E Xit`A(x,z), and x" ~ x'. By (e),
(b), A3 and Bk, these points exist. Choose (x,0) - a(x',0) }(1-a)(x",0)
such that (x,0) E Bnd A(x,z). By (c), (x,0) E A(x,z).
Suppose for some (z,0) E A(x,z),(z,0) ~i (x,0). By transitivity,
A(x,z) ~{(x,z)~(z,0) ~i (x,z)} n
XitO'
which is open by continuity.
Hence an open neighbourhood of (x,0) is also in A(x,z), which is a con-
tradiction. Hence (x,0) is a maximal element of A(x,z) w.r.t. 1i.
For all (x,0) E A(x,z): Cit(x,0) ~ it(x,0). Therefore Cit(x,z) - Cit(x,0).
(e) Suppose x' ~ x and ( x',z) E Cit (x'z) s ~it(x'0)' There exíst (f3k,K)
and
(xk,zk) E
Cit(x,0), for k E K}, such that ( x',z) - E6k(xk,zk) and
(x,z) - Esk(xk t (x-x'),zk). By (strong) monotonicity.:
t
(xk t(x-x') ~i (xk,zk) ~i (x,0), for all k E K. By continuity (x',0)
exists, such that for k E K}: (xk }(x-x'),zk) ~i (x',0) ?i (x,0). Hence
(x',0) E A(x,z). But in (d) it was shown that (x,0) ia a maximal element
of A(x,z). So we have a contradiction.Proof cf theorem 4.2.
~1 (tra.nsitivity): if (x',z') E Cit(x,z), then Cit(x',z') G Cit(x,z):
for since ( x',z') E C(x,0) for all (z,0) E A(x,z),
A(x',Z') C A(x,Z), by B~. Let ( x",z~~) iit (X',Z') ~it(X,Z)i
then (x",z") E Cit(x',z') and (x',z') E Cit(x,z), hence
(x~~~z~~) E Cit(x,z).
3.: (completeness): let Cit(x,z) - Cit(x,0) and Cit(x',z') - Cit(x',0),
applying lemma A. By B1 and B2,Cit(x',0) C Cit(x,0) and~or
Cit(x',0) ~ Cit(x,0)
h3 (weak monotonicity) can be proved by applying the argument used
to prove Á3, on each set Cit(x,0).
(strong monotonicity): let (x',z') ~it (x,z) and x" ~ x'.
By weak monotonicity of ~it. ( x"'z') E Cit(x',z') and by lemma
A: (x",z') E Cit(x',z'). Hence by the definition of
~it'
(x",z') 1it (x',z'), which implies by B1: (x",z') ~it (x,z).
ï34 (continuity): Cit(x,z) is closed since it is the convex hull of
a closed set, bounded below.
Let Pit(x'z) -{(x'z)I(x'z) ~it (x'z)}, It is to be proved that
this set is open.
Let Q- {(x,z)I(x,z) E Cit(x,z) and Sx ~ x:(z,z) E Cit(x,z)},
Clearly Q is open. By B3, we have Q C Pit(x,z).
Let (x',z') E pit(x,z). By lemma A, there exist (x,0) and (z',0)
such that Cit(x,z) - Cit(x,0) and Cit(x',z') - Cit(x',0), where
(X',0) ~i (x,0).
There exist (a,K) and ( x',z ) E C. (x',z'), for k E K}, such
k k it }
that ( x',2') - Eak(xk,zk). For k E K N(xk,zk) yi (x,0). By B5
there exist (xk,zk) E Xit, such that xk ~ xk and by continuity
(B4) there exist íck, such that xk ~ zk ~ xk and (~,zk) }i (x,0).
Hence (ícy,zk) E Cit(x,0) and (x,z) - Eak(~,zk) E Cit(x,z).
Hence (x',z') E Qi. So Pit(x,z) - Qi and is openB5 if (x',z') ~it (x,z), then (x',z') E Pit(x,z), and it was shown
above that Pit(x,z) 3 Qi. Hence (x',z) E Cit(x,z) C Xit with
x' ~ x exists.
Bó (convexity) by definition.
B. Procedure for finding an Pareto-optimum in E:
Step 1: Fix an arbitrary value of t~ and find an equilibrium in E p.
(1) 0 k (1) - 1 R(1) t
Determine ( xiR ,t ,u ) and
ai - - 0 zi ~
t
Step 2: Define an econotqy E ~(as in section 5.2) where the primary re-
a
sources however are given by (xi~),t(~)uR), i.e. this bundle consiets of
claims on commodities and obligations to work t(~) units of labour of type
fC, and the production set Y is determined from Y~ Y-{y(~),v(~)}
whereas the profit distribution Ai(p,q) is adapted from 9i(p,q), taking
into account the change of the production set.
In the resulting Lindahl equilibrium the consumption (xiR),t(2)uQ) is
a best element from the budget set
{x,z~p(2)x } qiR.)z ~ p(2)xik) - qiR)t(1) t 6(p~q) n(p~q).
(t(2 -t(~)) is the increase or decrease of each consumer's obligation to
work. The equilibrium production (y,v) is the change in production, star-
ting from (Y(~)~v(~))~ hence (y(2)~v(2)) - (
y(1)~v(i))
t (Y~v).
Step 3: Define an economy Et(2) (as in section 4.3) where mean resources
of type i consumers consist of claims on commodities and obligations to
(2) (2) (1) (2) 2 R
work ( xi ,z. )- EaiR Ni(xiR ,t u). The production set is
Y- Y-(y(2~,v(2)) and e.(p,q) is adapted from 6..
The resulting equilibriumlconsumption ( x~3),z~3))lis a best element frum
{x,z~p(3)x.
} q(3)z ~ p(3)x(3) ~ q(3)z(2) t é.(P~q) n(P.q)}~ and its
i Q i i i
composition (x(3),t~3)u ) makes each consumer hetter off.
iR
Type i consumers may change their labour suppl,}r, i.e. bi~y or sell obli-
gations to work. The new diatribution ia aiR ---~~ zi. The change in
production is (y,v) and (y(3),v(3)) - (y(2},v(2)) t (Y,v).And so on untill the variables do not change any. more, then a Pareto
aptimum is reached.
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